PDL PROJECTS

SELF SECURING STORAGE

Contact: Greg Ganger

Summary

The compromise independence of self-securing storage. The storage interface provides a physical boundary between a storage server and client OSes. Note that this samd picture works for block protocols, such as SCSI or IDE/ATA, and distributed file system protocols such as NFS or CIFS.

Self-securing storage is an exciting new technology for enhancing intrusion survival by enabling the storage device to safeguard data even when the client OS is compromised. It capitalizes on the fact that storage servers (whether file servers, disk array controllers, or even IDE disks) run separate software on separate hardware. This opens the door to server-embedded security that cannot be disabled by any software (even the OS) running on client systems as shown in the figure above. Of course, such servers have a narrow view of system activity, so they cannot distinguish legitimate users from clever impostors. But, from behind the thin storage interface, a self-securing storage server can actively look for suspicious behavior, retain an audit log of all storage requests, and prevent both destruction and undetectable tampering of stored data. The latter goals are achieved by retaining all versions of all data; instead of over-writing old data when a write command is issued, the storage server simply creates a new version and keeps both. Together with the audit log, the server-retained versions represent a complete history of system activity from the storage system’s point of view.

People

FACULTY

Greg Ganger

STAFF

Greg Economou

STUDENTS

Garth Goodson
Adam Pennington
Craig Soules
John Strunk

Publications


SELF SECURING STORAGE

Acknowledgements

This material is based on research sponsored by the Air Force Research Laboratory, under agreement number F49620-01-1-0433, and by DARPA/ITO's OASIS program, under Air Force contract number F30602-99-2-0539-AFRL. The U.S. Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for Governmental purposes notwithstanding any copyright notation thereon. The views and conclusions contained herein are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed or implied, of the Air Force Research Laboratory or the U.S. Government.

We thank the members and companies of the PDL Consortium: Actifio, American Power Conversion, EMC Corporation, Facebook, Fusion-io,Google, Hewlett-Packard Labs, Hitachi, Huawei Technologies Co., Intel Corporation, Microsoft Research, NEC Laboratories, NetApp, Inc., Oracle Corporation, Panasas, Samsung Information Systems America, Seagate Technology, Symantec Corporation, VMware, Inc., and Western Digital for their interest, insights, feedback, and support.

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© 2014. Last updated 15 March, 2012