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    iSCSI User Auth MIB - security issue



    Folks,
    
    AD and Expert Review of the User Identity Authentication MIB
    for iSCSI, draft-ietf-ips-auth-mib-04.txt, has turned up
    some serious security issues with the following two MIB objects:
    
     	- ipsAuthCredChapPassword
     	- ipsAuthCredSrpPassword
    
    Aside from the first one being misnamed (iSCSI requirements
    for CHAP prohibit using something as weak as a password),
    the major issue is that even with SNMPv3, it's not possible
    to write to these objects with security comparable to the
    underlying authentication mechanisms.  SNMPv3 security
    apparently does not currently support any encryption 
    stronger than DES, making a 56-bit DES key the weak
    link if these fields are written via SNMPv3, and anyone
    who writes these fields without encryption is probably
    clue-impaired.
    
    I'm seeking input on how to move forward.  There are
    two basic choices:
    
    (1) Delete those two objects and rename this MIB to be an
    Authorization MIB in some fashion.
    
    Despite its Authentication name, this MIB is mostly about
    authorization - determining which identities are allowed to
    participate in an iSCSI session.  This choice would involve
    deleting the above two fields, renaming the MIB from  an
    "Authentication" MIB to something containing "Authorization" or
    "Access Control", and revising appropriate descriptive text
    accordingly.  The resulting MIB would still be able to
    configure which identities and related credentials could be
    used for by iSCSI counterparts, but would not be able to
    set CHAP secrets or SRP passwords.
    
    (2) Retain those two objects either via redesign or work on
    SNMPv3 to improve available encryption.
    
    If the WG feels that the ability to set CHAP secrets and SRP
    passwords via this MIB is crucial to the functional utility of
    the MIB, it is possible do work to improve their security,
    either via higher security MIB objects (e.g., along the lines
    of the KeyChange TC in RFC 2274) or by providing stronger
    encryption for SNMPv3.  Both would involve significant work
    and take significant time.
    
    My inclination would be to remove the fields (1), as it's 
    simpler and appears to retain most of the useful functionality,
    but I wanted to ask WG members whether the resulting loss of
    functionality is sufficiently severe to favor an alternative
    approach of increasing the security of the objects involved (2).
    
    Please comment.
    
    Thanks,
    --David
    
    ----------------------------------------------------
    David L. Black, Senior Technologist
    EMC Corporation, 176 South St., Hopkinton, MA  01748
    +1 (508) 293-7953             FAX: +1 (508) 293-7786
    black_david@emc.com        Mobile: +1 (978) 394-7754
    ----------------------------------------------------
     
    


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Last updated: Wed Jun 25 22:19:22 2003
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