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    iSCSI - RFC editor notes



    As part of IESG approval of iSCSI, two notes to the RFC Editor
    were issued (see below) to do the following to the -20 draft:
    
    (1) Explain the risks of sharing CHAP secrets.
    (2) Restore the requirement for Unit Attention on implicit
    	task termination.
    
    FYI,
    --David
    
    > RFC Editor Note:
    > 
    > Dear RFC Editor,
    > 
    > Please make the following changes to draft-ietf-ips-iscsi-20.txt -
    > 
    > (1) In Section 8.2.1, replace the following old text at the end of
    > the section:
    > 
    >  A single CHAP secret MAY be used for authentication of an individual
    >  initiator to multiple targets. Likewise, a single CHAP secret MAY be
    >  used for authentication of an individual target to multiple
    >  initiators.
    > 
    > with the following new text:
    > 
    >  When an iSCSI initiator or target authenticates itself to
    >  counterparts in multiple administrative domains, it SHOULD use
    >  a different CHAP secret for each administrative domain to avoid
    >  propagating security compromises across domains.
    > 
    >  Within a single administrative domain:
    >  - A single CHAP secret MAY be used for authentication of an
    >  initiator to multiple targets.
    >  - A single CHAP secret MAY be used for an authentication of a
    >  target to multiple initiators when the initiators use an
    >  external server (e.g., RADIUS) to verify the target's CHAP
    >  responses and do not know the target's CHAP secret.
    > 
    >  If an external response verification server (e.g., RADIUS) is
    >  not used, employing a single CHAP secret for authentication of
    >  a target to multiple initiators requires that all such initiators
    >  know that target secret. Any of these initiators can impersonate 
    >  the target to any other such initiator, and compromise of such
    >  an initiator enables an attacker to impersonate the target to
    >  all such initiators. Targets SHOULD use separate CHAP secrets
    >  for authentication to each initiator when such risks are of
    >  concern; in this situation it may be useful to configure a
    >  separate logical iSCSI target with its own iSCSI Node Name for
    >  each initiator or group of initiators among which such
    >  separation is desired.
    > 
    > 
    > (2) In both Section 6.5 and 10.14.5, remove the following text near
    > the end of each section:
    > 
    >  UA for the next command on the I_T nexus in cases a), b), and c)
    > 
    > so that the resulting parenthesized comment reads:
    > 
    >  (e.g., queued commands and ACA, etc.)
    > 
    > and also add the following sentence to the end of the same paragraph:
    > 
    >  In cases a), b), and c), after the tasks are terminated, the
    >  target MUST report a unit attention condition on the next
    >  command processed for each affected I_T_L nexus regardless
    >  of the connection to which that command is allegiant.
    > 
    > These changes are to be made to both Section 6.5 and 10.14.5.
    


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Last updated: Thu Feb 13 16:19:11 2003
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