iSCSI: SRP vs DH-CHAP

["Julian Satran" <Julian_Satran@il.ibm.com>]

I agree that we should reconsider SRP as a MUST implement.  Julo
----- Forwarded by Julian Satran/Haifa/IBM on 04-04-02 13:48 -----

"Mallikarjun C." <cbm@rose.hp.com> Sent by: owner-ips@ece.cmu.edu 03-04-02 03:26 Please respond to "Mallikarjun C."

To:        <ips@ece.cmu.edu>         cc:                 Subject:        iSCSI: SRP vs DH-CHAP

All:

As we all know, there is an effort underway to DH-enhance the
CHAP protocol, or perhaps invent a new authentication mechanism
as "MUST implement" in lieu of SRP.  I have a couple of comments
in this regard.

- Given that Lucent's new clarification came after Minneapolis, let's 
   consider the possibility that several/most WG participants are now
   favorably inclined to go with SRP as the "MUST implement".  Can 
   folks with continuing concerns on SRP please speak up? [ This is *not*
   a legal advice; but HP's lawyers do not see any issues for Hewlett-Packard 
   in the area of SRP. ]

- I find the statement that IESG would send back the iSCSI draft if
   it thinks that a sufficient analysis hadn't been done on DH-CHAP
   to be surprising to say the least.  If SRP meets the needs (more on this
   in the next bullet) and SRP has an IPR situation that's deemed 
   acceptable from IETF's perspective (let's recall that SRP is a 
   standards track RFC), why would IESG return the iSCSI spec back? 
   [ To provide the context for this question, consider that EMC is in 
     a similar situation with iSCSI - http://www.ietf.org/ietf/IPR/EMC-IPS 
   - using generally the same language as we had seen with Lucent. ]

- A procedural question in this regard is the seeming lack of 
   documented requirements for the authentication mechanism.  I 
   don't really see a list of requirements stated in the security draft,
   even though there's general text that discusses some issues.  (BTW,
   the iSCSI requirements draft (rightly) does not go to the depth we're
   seeking here). I am equally to blame for this, but I was under the 
   impression that we had a list of *documented* requirements to 
   evaluate candidates - and we chose SRP.  I was somewhat surprised 
   to see that we now seem to be defining/weakening requirements afresh 
   in some of the recent email threads I had seen.  I admit that I am not 
   a security expert, but I am personally not _yet_ clear on the requirements.... 
-- 
Mallikarjun 


Mallikarjun Chadalapaka
Networked Storage Architecture
Network Storage Solutions Organization
MS 5668 Hewlett-Packard, Roseville.
cbm@rose.hp.com

  


----- Forwarded by Julian Satran/Haifa/IBM on 04-04-02 13:48 -----

John Hufferd/San Jose/IBM@IBMUS Sent by: owner-ips@ece.cmu.edu 31-03-02 00:44 Please respond to John Hufferd

To:        ips@ece.cmu.edu         cc:                 Subject:        iSCSI:SRP

Folks,
With the new statement from Lucent, we are now back to the point were we
were previously when we agreed to make SRP Must implement.

I propose that we go to the position we had before all this flap developed
about patent statement, and declare SRP MUST implement (as we did before),
and get that out of the way of our last call.

The code is available from Stanford's web site, and the Patent issue is now
just like others within the IETF.

I know there are some folks that are attempting to wrap additional security
around Chap, and that may be a good thing -- but we do not need to hold up
Last call as folks check out other options.  Remember, it is always the
quickly produced "fixes" at the last moment, that have a higher probability
of having a problem.

Again, lets make SRP Must implement, and Chap at least May implement,
declare the proposed additional Chap security as May Implement, and move
on.

.
.
.
John L. Hufferd
Senior Technical Staff Member (STSM)
IBM/SSG San Jose Ca
Main Office (408) 256-0403, Tie: 276-0403,  eFax: (408) 904-4688
Home Office (408) 997-6136, Cell: (408) 499-9702
Internet address: hufferd@us.ibm.com