RE: Question on security document

[Robert Snively <rsnively@Brocade.COM>]

Paul,

I rather prefer to see the security mandates carried in
the primary documents, as our IETF mentors originally proposed.
That way, there is less possibility of inconsistent
language that may change the primary documents.  Then the
security document would be a tutorial and remain informational.
This will simplify the standardization process, because 
each of us will only have to read the security document for
guidelines to our development of the security section of the
primary documents.  If we were to make the security document
the standard, then each of us will have to
read the entire document to make sure that some global
restriction does not fall unintentionally on a particular
protocol.  

If we do choose to make the security document the authoritative
document (which I would vote against), then it needs a major 
rewrite to clarify, separate, and make more precise the requirements for
each protocol.

Charles,  

If the security document was intended as a draft of the security
sections for each protocol, it needs a major rewrite to separate
the particular language to be dropped into each document from the
tutorial information.  It then needs to formulate much more
clearly and formally the language that will be dropped into the
primary documents.  That would be okay with me, but the draft
should indicate that the language to be dropped into the
primary documents is only proposed and that the actual applicable
standards information is contained in the primary document.

Bob

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Paul Koning [mailto:ni1d@arrl.net]
> Sent: Thursday, October 18, 2001 7:37 AM
> To: cmonia@NishanSystems.com
> Cc: ips@ece.cmu.edu
> Subject: RE: Question on security document
> 
> 
> Excerpt of message (sent 17 October 2001) by Charles Monia:
> > Hi:
> > 
> > I had assumed that one goal of the document was to set 
> forth the language
> > necessary for each spec to pass muster with the IESG in the realm of
> > security.  If that's correct, I'm concerned that the 
> suggested change may
> > compromise that intent.
> > 
> > Charles
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: Robert Snively [mailto:rsnively@Brocade.COM]
> > > Sent: Wednesday, October 17, 2001 4:31 PM
> > > To: 'ips@ece.cmu.edu'
> > > Subject: Question on security document
> > > 
> > > 
> > > I have a recommendation to the authors of the security 
> > > document:
> > > ...
> 
> The problem, as Bob is right to point out, is that informational RFCs
> by definition cannot establish requirements on implementations.  So if
> you want there to be security requirements that apply to iFCP, iSCSI,
> and so on, they can only be stated in standards track RFCs, not
> informational RFCs.  It may be a separate document or part of the IPS
> document it applies to.
> 
> So one answer is for the security draft not to be informational
> anymore.
> 
> 	paul
> 
>