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    RE: iSCSI IPsec-Related Algorithm Proposal



    
    
    I think security issues go beyond the rekeying and I doubt that manual
    keying is an
    acceptable solution (not even as a starter) as it creates a management
    nightmare even in moderately
    sized installations and is barely supported in host systems (manually
    inserting keys AND SPIs).
    
    Howard is has a good point about schedules. and he is also pointing us
    towards
    a solution - select a minimum subset and get fast in place a keying
    mechanism that is both well understood and accepted.
    
    Julo
    
    
    
    Black_David@emc.com on 30-06-2001 03:24:54
    
    Please respond to Black_David@emc.com
    
    To:   howard.c.herbert@intel.com, ips@ece.cmu.edu
    cc:
    Subject:  RE: iSCSI IPsec-Related Algorithm Proposal
    
    
    
    
    > Specifically, phase one products would use AES CBC MAC mode as the
    integrity
    > algorithm and AES CBC mode as the confidentiality algorithm.  This
    proposal
    > means vendors only have to implement a single base-algorithm with slight
    > mode variations in order to have a complete 1 Gbit solution (integrity
    and
    > confidentiality).  Adopting AES in phase one also establishes a
    foundation
    > upon which to build phase two solutions (different modes of operation on
    the
    > same base algorithm).
    
    What would you recommend as reference specifications for these algorithms,
    and specifically their use with ESP?  There are no RFCs specifying this,
    and I haven't seen an Internet-Draft on the MAC (there is one on use of
    AES for confidentiality).  My personal preference would be for something
    AES-based (perhaps using one of the new SHA hashes in an HMAC instead
    of the AES CBC MAC) rather than falling back to things like SHA-1 and 3DES.
    
    Meanwhile, we have another issue.  As of the outcome of the Nashua meeting,
    the minimum (MUST implement) requirement for keying ESP was manual keying.
    That's not going to be sufficient because there will be situations in which
    iSCSI
    causes ESP's 32-bit sequence number to roll over, creating a vulnerability
    to
    replay attacks.  This is going to require specification of a MUST implement
    rekeying algorithm.  IKE or a subset is one possibility, and working out
    the
    details of SRP-based keying (and rekeying) of ESP is another.  A somewhat
    drafty draft on the latter may appear prior to London assuming that I can
    find
    the "copious spare time" to get it written.
    
    Comments?
    
    Thanks,
    --David
    
    ---------------------------------------------------
    David L. Black, Senior Technologist
    EMC Corporation, 42 South St., Hopkinton, MA  01748
    +1 (508) 435-1000 x75140     FAX: +1 (508) 497-8500
    black_david@emc.com       Mobile: +1 (978) 394-7754
    ---------------------------------------------------
    
    
    
    
    


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Last updated: Tue Sep 04 01:04:22 2001
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