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    RE: Security Use Requirements



    
    Bernard,
    I think that Julian addressed this, but, an installation might want only
    the connection to the local environment, and if so administratively tell
    the iSCSI ends to not do the encryption etc.  Especially if some of the
    ends are Laptops and Desktops.  But all side must implement the features.
    
    By the way you might have slightly overstated the IPSec chips going at full
    gig speed, when you talk about triple Des.  And if there are some they are
    not within the normal costs one would expect for a iSCSI NIC HBA.
    
    .
    .
    .
    John L. Hufferd
    Senior Technical Staff Member (STSM)
    IBM/SSG San Jose Ca
    (408) 256-0403, Tie: 276-0403,  eFax: (408) 904-4688
    Internet address: hufferd@us.ibm.com
    
    
    "Bernard Aboba" <aboba@internaut.com>@ece.cmu.edu on 02/05/2001 03:26:13 PM
    
    Sent by:  owner-ips@ece.cmu.edu
    
    
    To:   <Black_David@emc.com>, <ips@ece.cmu.edu>
    cc:   "RJ Atkinson" <rja@inet.org>, "Smb@Research. Att. Com"
          <smb@research.att.com>
    Subject:  RE: Security Use Requirements
    
    
    
    It is hard for me to see how you could
    get away with no security services at all
    (e.g. no per-packet authentication and integrity
    protection for iSCSI PDUs).
    
    After all, we're talking about facilities
    that are used by the world's major financial
    institutions. If this data isn't worth protecting,
    I don't know what is. Do you really want
    attackers to be able to manipulate the contents
    of bank accounts at will over the Internet?
    
    Furthermore, there really isn't a sound technical
    argument for dispensing with security. There are
    chipsets available that can provide IPSEC
    integrity and authentication services at
    speeds of 1 Gbps or higher.
    
    
    
    -----Original Message-----
    From: owner-ips@ece.cmu.edu [mailto:owner-ips@ece.cmu.edu]On Behalf Of
    Black_David@emc.com
    Sent: Monday, February 05, 2001 12:54 PM
    To: ips@ece.cmu.edu
    Subject: Security Use Requirements
    
    
    In Orlando, I picked up an action item to determine what
    the requirements are for *use* of security features,
    as opposed to requirements for *implementation*.  I
    believe the answer to be that it is acceptable to
    specify security measures weaker than those one would
    want to use in full generality on a public network,
    where "weaker" includes no security.
    
    There are two important caveats that apply:
    - Security of the negotiation mechanism becomes
         very important when this is done, as there's
         an obvious man-in-the-middle attack on the
         negotiation mechanism to get the endpoints
         to negotiate weaker security than they intended.
    - The weaker security mechanisms need to be documented
         in terms of their security properties (and lack
         thereof), as well as environments in which they
         are appropriate.  The "Security Considerations"
         section of RFC 2338 (VRRP) has been recommended
         as a good example of this.
    
    --David
    ---------------------------------------------------
    David L. Black, Senior Technologist
    EMC Corporation, 42 South St., Hopkinton, MA  01748
    +1 (508) 435-1000 x75140     FAX: +1 (508) 497-8500
    black_david@emc.com       Mobile: +1 (978) 394-7754
    ---------------------------------------------------
    
    
    
    
    
    


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Last updated: Tue Sep 04 01:05:35 2001
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