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    iSCSI Auth MIB - resolution and next steps



    About a week ago I sent out email that said:
    
      AD and Expert Review of the User Identity Authentication MIB
      for iSCSI, draft-ietf-ips-auth-mib-04.txt, has turned up
      some serious security issues with the following two MIB objects:
    
     	- ipsAuthCredChapPassword
     	- ipsAuthCredSrpPassword
    
    Since then, it has also become clear that there are design
    problems with both objects.  The first one is mis-named and
    lacks a description of the required strength of the CHAP
    secret.  The second one has a more serious problem - it is
    not consistent with the SRP architectural structure in RFC
    2945, as the MIB objects should be the verifier and salt
    to avoid having to send the password "in the clear" (with
    respect to the MIB).
    
    On the list, I have seen a note that a normative reference
    to about-to-be-approved (and hence not widely deployed)
    SNMP functionality could provide adequate security for these
    objects, but no indications (strong or otherwise) that this
    functionality (set CHAP secrets, SRP verifiers and salts)
    is important to have in this MIB.  I therefore believe that
    the rough consensus of the IPS WG is that the above two
    objects are not essential to the functionality of this MIB.
    
    The best course of action at this juncture is to delete the
    above two objects from the MIB - the MIB authors are
    hereby instructed to prepare a revised version of the MIB
    that deletes the objects, removes the word "Authentication"
    from the title of the Internet-Draft, and revises the
    descriptive text to indicate that this MIB manages the
    user identity aspects of authorization and/or access
    control - authentication management (e.g., set and/or
    change authentication secrets) is done via other means.
    
    If at some point, authentication secret management
    functionality becomes important, the MIB can be revised
    and extended.
    
    Thanks,
    --David
    
    ----------------------------------------------------
    David L. Black, Senior Technologist
    EMC Corporation, 176 South St., Hopkinton, MA  01748
    +1 (508) 293-7953             FAX: +1 (508) 293-7786
    black_david@emc.com        Mobile: +1 (978) 394-7754
    ----------------------------------------------------
    


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Last updated: Thu Jul 10 08:19:38 2003
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