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    RE: AD review of draft-ietf-dhc-isnsoption-05.txt



    Hi Thomas:
    
    Thanks for your input.
    
    I will be making the changes to fix the editorial problems you've pointed
    out along with adding the section on IANA considerations.  I have asked for
    input from the other co-authors on the technical issues, including vendor
    specific fields and security and will post responses to those issues when
    available.
    
    -- Charles
    -----------------------------------------
    Charles Monia
    Senior Technology Consultant
    Nishan Systems
    email: cmonia@nishansystems.com
    voice: (408) 519-3986
    fax:   (408) 435-8385
     
    
    > -----Original Message-----
    > From: Thomas Narten [mailto:narten@us.ibm.com] 
    > Sent: Tuesday, April 22, 2003 10:30 AM
    > To: cmonia@nishansystems.com; jtseng@nishansystems.com; 
    > kgibbons@nishansystems.com
    > Cc: dhcwg@ietf.org
    > Subject: AD review of draft-ietf-dhc-isnsoption-05.txt 
    > 
    > General issues:
    > 
    > I'd like to see a justification for the vendor specific fields. I'd
    > like to understand how these can be safely used without leading to
    > interoperability issues. Besides, there are other ways in DHC to do
    > vendor-specific things. Can we just remove them from this
    > option/document?
    > 
    > The security considerations section is rather weak.
    > 
    > General note: this document is inconsitent about bit ordering. Some
    > picture show bits numbered left-to-right, others right-to-left. Please
    > pick one and be consistent.
    > 
    > needs an IANA considerations section. 
    > 
    > I assume a revision of the document would be in order before starting
    > the IETF LC.
    > 
    > Specific comments follow.
    > 
    > >                    DHCP Options for Internet Storage Name Service
    > 
    > Would be good for the title to note that this is for DHCP for
    > IPv4. E.g.:
    > 
    >               The IPv4 DHCP Option for Internet Storage Name Service
    > 
    > Abstract doesn't satisfy ID nits; e.g., has unexpanded acronyms.
    > 
    > "iSNS" used before being defined.
    > 
    > ditto for iSCSI, iFCP, etc.
    > 
    >         The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for Ipv4 provides a
    > 
    > s/Ipv4/IPv4/
    > 
    > >         Existing DHCP option numbers are not plausible due 
    > to the following
    > >         reasons:
    > 
    > suggested reword:
    > 
    >          Existing DHCP options cannot be used to find iSNS servers for
    >          the following reasons:
    > 
    > >         Length: the number of bytes that follow the Length 
    > field.  The
    > >                 minimum value for the Length field is 6 in 
    > order to account
    > >                 for the iSNS Functions, Discovery Domain Access, and
    > >                 Administrative Flags fields.
    > 
    > From the picture, it seems like the minimum length is more than
    > 6. Are some of the fields optional?
    > 
    > >         certificates for the use of iSCSI and iFCP devices. 
    > The format of
    > >         the iSNS Role bit field is shown in Figure 2:
    > > 
    > >                        1       2                   3
    > >                        6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    > >                      +--+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    > >                      |Vendor-Specific |RESERVED |S|A|E|
    > >                      +--+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    > >                      Figure 2 -- iSNS Functions
    > 
    > I don't see how a vendor-specific portion of this option facilitates
    > interoperability. Remove?
    > 
    > Also, caling it the "iSNS Role" field is confusing, since that is not
    > used in the previous figure. SHouldn't this be the "iSNS Functions"
    > field?
    > 
    > 
    > >                 Bit field     Significance
    > >                 ---------     ------------
    > >                 31            Function Fields Enabled
    > >                 30            DD-Based Authorization
    > >                 29            Security policy distribution
    > >                 28 - 24       Reserved
    > >                 23 - 16       Vendor-specific
    > 
    > You need a transistion sentence saying what field is being talked
    > about. Presumably, this is "iSNS Server Security Bitmap"?
    > 
    > >                 Enabled:        This bit specifies the 
    > validity of the
    > 
    > Spell out "Function Fields Enabled", as that is the name of the field
    > per the picture.
    > 
    > >                 Security:       Indicates whether the iSNS 
    > client is to
    > 
    > spell out field name.
    > 
    > >                 Vendor-         These bits are used to 
    > indicate the vendor-
    > >                 Specific:       specific capabilities 
    > supported by the
    > >                                  indicated iSNS server.
    > 
    > Again, this does not promote interoperability. There are other ways in
    > DHC to communicate vendor specific information.
    > 
    > General note: this document is inconsitent about bit ordering. Some
    > picture show bits numbered left-to-right, others right-to-left. Please
    > pick one and be consistent.
    > 
    > >      3.       Security Considerations
    > > 
    > >         DHCP currently provides no authentication or 
    > security mechanisms.
    > >         Potential exposures to attack are discussed in 
    > section 7 of the DHCP
    > >         protocol specification [DHCP].
    > 
    > What about RFC 3118?
    > 
    > 
    > >         iSNS security considerations are discussed in 
    > [iSNS] and [SEC-IPS].
    > >         With regard to security considerations specific to 
    > the use of this
    > >         DHCP option to discover the location of the iSNS 
    > server, exposure to
    > >         a "man-in-the-middle" attack by an hostile entity 
    > modifying or
    > >         replacing the original iSNS option message should 
    > be considered a
    > >         potential security exposure.  To prevent an 
    > attacker from weakening
    > >         the required security and potentially tricking the 
    > iSNS client into
    > >         connecting into rogue iSNS servers, reliance on 
    > local security
    > >         policy configuration is an appropriate countermeasure.
    > 
    > This says almost nothing. What can happen if there is a  man-in-the
    > middle? Really bad things? or just DOS? And what "local security
    > policy configuration" helps mitigate the threats?
    > 
    > Thomas
    > 
    


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