RE: iSCSI extension algorithms (was no subject)

[Black_David@emc.com]

> > And to head off the next question, if the advocates of X-com.bar.foo
> > authentication want to get out from under the requirement in the
> > previous paragraph, they make the effort to have the IETF standardize
> > that authentication method.  If that succeeds, and the algorithm is
> > assigned something other than an X- key, none of this discussion
> > applies to it at that point.
> 
> Wouldn't those advocates also have to also make it a MUST?
> 
> Because as long as the algorithm in question isn't a MUST, we have this
> issue. The case you describe above for an X- method also applies for a
> device that only ships with Kerberos, SRP, or one of the public key
> methods; since those methods are optional, we have the exact same
> interop-by-default issue.

No, because the interop-by-default issue, and all of the text we're
discussing applies *only* to non-standard extension algorithms.  This
issue is part of a larger IESG "hot button" on prohibition of mandatory
vendor-specific extensions, hence getting a vendor-specific extension
standardized, even if it's a MAY, is enough to get it out from under
this set of requirements (as there's now a publicly available spec
on how to implement it).

Thanks,
--David
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David L. Black, Senior Technologist
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