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    RE: iSCSI extension algorithms (was no subject)




    Nick,

    An administrator can configure them by fixing the ordering.
    The point that Steve Belovin was making is that you should not allow a proprietary extension to force a "me or None" solution and claim compliance.

    Julo


    "Martin, Nick (Server Storage)" <Nick.Martin@hp.com>

    08/01/03 20:20

    To
    Julian Satran/Haifa/IBM@IBMIL, "Steve Bellovin" <smb@research.att.com>, <Black_David@emc.com>
    cc
    <ips@ece.cmu.edu>
    Subject
    RE: iSCSI extension algorithms (was no subject)





    Julian and All,
     
    The "MUST also be offered" is the part I have a problem with.  
     
    I have always seen a big distinction between what is required to be implemented, versus what is offered during negotiation.  We appear to be mandating that a stroage administrator must not be allowed to configure a target to allow authentication Z  (an extension) and no other.  In the future it may be the case that Z is a site standard and no other is acceptable.  
     
    If I understand correctly, the intention is that one can not claim iSCSI compliance without implementing (at least one of) the currently specified methods.
    I think this is a poor way to state/enforce that intention.
     
    The administrator of the target should select the preferred and/or acceptable authentication methods (from the list implemented by his vendor) to be offered (allowed to be selected during negotiation) by each target under his administration.  The same for initiators.  
     
    We say other algorithms may be implemented and negotiated.  However, we are now saying that an administrator may not decide to offer (allow) neither of the current authentication methods in favor of something else.  I think we are also implying targets and initiators must enforce this.
     
    The iSCSI spec has to this point avoided prescribing such restrictions on administration.
     
    Thanks,
    Nick
     
    -----Original Message-----
    From:
    Julian Satran [mailto:Julian_Satran@il.ibm.com]
    Sent:
    Wednesday, January 08, 2003 5:18 AM
    To:
    Steve Bellovin; Black_David@emc.com
    Cc:
    ips@ece.cmu.edu
    Subject:



    The intent of the "offending" statement in 11.1 was to have a strong player with a new method forcing everybody into it by not offering anything else.

    I guess the phrasing was bad.  Simply removing None will not do it since None may still remain a valid option if both parties agree:


    I would suggest the new phrasing to be:


    Private or public extension algorithms MAY also be negotiated for authentication methods. Whenever a private or public extension algorithm is offered, at least one of the authentication methods defined in this document MUST also be offered as an option.


    Julo




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Last updated: Thu Jan 09 16:18:59 2003
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