RE: iSCSI: Login authentication SRP/CHAP

["John Hufferd" <hufferd@us.ibm.com>]

Bill,
This was all discussed in Irvine, we need to move on to things which will
help us close the Spec.

.
.
.
John L. Hufferd
Senior Technical Staff Member (STSM)
IBM/SSG San Jose Ca
Main Office (408) 256-0403, Tie: 276-0403,  eFax: (408) 904-4688
Home Office (408) 997-6136
Internet address: hufferd@us.ibm.com


"Bill Strahm" <bill@Sanera.net> on 10/19/2001 08:35:59 AM

To:   John Hufferd/San Jose/IBM@IBMUS
cc:   "IPS Reflector \(E-mail\)" <ips@ece.cmu.edu>
Subject:  RE: iSCSI: Login authentication SRP/CHAP



But it is Required to implement, so the link has as much security as the
administrator requires for the situation.  So if IPsec is not being used it
is because a) the administrator doesn't care about wire security b) the
administrator doesn't have anything that needs to be protected c) the
administrator doesn't have the resources to protect it.  So for those
reasons I don't buy the argument in your first paragraph...

The rest is just strict ACL... For you do not need SRP to provide identity
information, I could just as easily send username="Bill" password="foo"
over
the wire and it will provide the same functionality (all SRP does is
prevent
you from having to send Bill and foo over the wire directly at the cost of
a
lot of mathematics.  And with a link that is administratively configured to
be adequately secure, I don't see the problem with it.

I do not understand why you are requiring IPsec/IKE, but refusing to
consider a much simpler to configure/support TLS.  It sounds like many of
the problems that you are having that are requiring you to go with a
protocol that has unknown IP rights, and licensing behind it could be
easily
solved by changing the security from IPsec to TLS, but that is my opinion.

I think the problem is that people are trying to solve way too many
problems, assume that IPsec has adiquate link security and go from there.
If IPsec is not capable of securing the link, then remove the solution and
replace it with a technology that can secure the link...

Bill
+========+=========+=========+=========+=========+=========+=========+
Bill Strahm     Software Development is a race between Programmers
Member of the   trying to build bigger and better idiot proof software
Technical Staff and the Universe trying to produce bigger and better
bill@sanera.net idiots.
(503) 601-0263  So far the Universe is winning --- Rich Cook


-----Original Message-----
From: John Hufferd [mailto:hufferd@us.ibm.com]
Sent: Friday, October 19, 2001 1:54 AM
To: Bill Strahm
Cc: IPS Reflector (E-mail)
Subject: RE: iSCSI: Login authentication SRP/CHAP



Bill,
IPSec is optional to use!  So you can not assume that you have a Secure
connection.  And even if you use IPSec, you can not be sure that Privacy
(encryption) is being used.  So for these reasons alone you need to have an
iSCSI method of Authentication.

Next, the lower levels only know that the link is OK to be use for
something.  It does not know that it is iSCSI that is using the link, and
if it did it does not have access to the iSCSI ACLs.  Nor does iSCSI know
what is handled at the lower levels so it must do its own ACL processing.

Even if the link is secure (perhaps even encrypted) and iSCSI
Authentication finds out that you are user "Bill", that does not say that
you have the right to get at All resources.  "Bill" will be authorized to
operate from certain iSCSI Initiator Nodes, and those nodes will only be
permitted to see certain approprate LUs.  These are all iSCSI functions NOT
TCP or IPSec.

Your suggestion to use TLS, was fully discussed in Irvine, and that issue
is now behind us.



.
.
.
John L. Hufferd
Senior Technical Staff Member (STSM)
IBM/SSG San Jose Ca
Main Office (408) 256-0403, Tie: 276-0403,  eFax: (408) 904-4688
Home Office (408) 997-6136
Internet address: hufferd@us.ibm.com


"Bill Strahm" <bill@sanera.net>@ece.cmu.edu on 10/17/2001 02:19:38 PM

Sent by:  owner-ips@ece.cmu.edu


To:   "IPS Reflector \(E-mail\)" <ips@ece.cmu.edu>
cc:
Subject:  RE: iSCSI: Login authentication SRP/CHAP



Just to bring up a cynical point.  Why do we need SRP anyway... after all I
am running over a required secure channel, so there should be no problem
with just sending a user ID/Passphrase over the secure channel.  This will
prevent a LOT of interoperability problems, extra code required to
implement
additional security algorithms, etc.

This makes my implementation much simpler, I can seperate
login/authentication parameters (currently SRP) vs. setting up a secure
channel (IPsec).  If we go the Application level secure authentication
method, I would rather we replace the security layer with TLS rather than
IPsec, so we get authentication/security all in one place rather than
scattered around lower layer protocols, application protocols...

Bill Strahm
+========+=========+=========+=========+=========+=========+=========+
Bill Strahm     Software Development is a race between Programmers
Member of the   trying to build bigger and better idiot proof software
Technical Staff and the Universe trying to produce bigger and better
bill@sanera.net idiots.
(503) 601-0263  So far the Universe is winning --- Rich Cook


-----Original Message-----
From: owner-ips@ece.cmu.edu [mailto:owner-ips@ece.cmu.edu]On Behalf Of
Michael Schoberg
Sent: Wednesday, October 17, 2001 12:53 PM
To: IPS Reflector (E-mail)
Subject: iSCSI: Login authentication SRP/CHAP


I'm having some problems figuring out the exact implementation for the
login
authentication protocols being proposed.  Is anyone else having similar
issues answering these questions:

What is the hashing algorithm that will be used for SRP authentication
(SHA-1, MD5, HMAC-SHA1)?

The SRP negotiation passes the following information (T->I):

SRP_s = SRP salt
SRP_N = (SRP n value - Large prime number.  All computations are performed
modulo n)
SRP_g = Primitive root modulo of n

By passing [N] & [g] (T->I), does this mean the initiator must verify that
[N] is a prime and [g] is a primitive root modulo of [N]?  What are the
min/max digits for [N] and [g]?  If any of these are not satisfied (N not
prime, g not primitive modulo root, #digits too small or large), could it
be
used as an attack against the initiator or be used to derive the
initiator's
password?



The reference to RFC 1994 does not fully describe the CHAP function for
iSCSI, it describes the CHAP message protocol which isn't really used in
our
case.  There's some parameters that need to be nailed down.  What is the
CHAP hash algorithm: (MD5)?  What is the sequence of hashes that take place
on a CHAP challenge to form the CHAP digest?

The iSCSI draft allows for algorithm selection (CHAP_A=<A1,A2,...>) but
doesn't describe any.  Are these supposed to dictate the hashing function
or
give a description of [what/how it] gets hashed (or both)?  Will there be a
mandatory set (A1..An) that compliant iSCSI implementations must provide?
Is there a reference that actually shows the sequence for a CHAP digest
being formed from MD5 hashes?



It would help to have an appendix with real username/password examples of
the result exchange?  A table with a few sample sets would be useful for
validating designs.