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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] iSNS and zoning>
In looking at iSNS draft, I get the impression that the zoning service
as currently defined is a poor mimicking of its Fibre Channel counter
part. In FC fabric, the switch has several mechanisms to prevent an
N/NL_Port from unauthorised/unintended accesses, since it is part of
the access path. However, with iSNS, which could be a stand alone name
server, I'm having hard time understanding how this storage name server
could enforce the claims made in the draft, such as:
a)
> 3.1.3 Network Zoning Service
> .... snip ....
> The Network Zoning Service implements the functionality to support
> grouping of iSNS client devices into domains for administrative and
> access control purposes.
> ....
b)
> 4.3 Zone Object
>
> .... snip ....
> Zoning is a security and management mechanism used to partition
> storage resources. Zoning prevents initiators from potentially
> logging in to every possible target during device discovery.
> ....
iSNS as currently defined is only a repository of information of the so
called zones. It has no way to prevent an authorised rogue iSCSI initiator
from setting up a TCP connection with an iSCSI target. The best place to
implement security and access control is the iSCSI target itself.
-JP
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