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    RE: IPS security draft: SRP groups



    I was unsuccessful at getting Mathematica to prove the primality of the SRP moduli.
    
    If we cannot prove the primality of our chosen moduli I thought why not use moduli whose primality has been proven such as the well known groups in Oakley. Tom Wu told me that would not be a problem provided we found generators for them other than 2 (the generator that is given in Oakley RFC), since 2 in not useful for SRP. 
    
    Using Mathematica I have been able to find other generators for the groups. The 768-bit modulus from IPSEc has 7 as a generator. The 1024-bit prime from IPsec RFC-2539 has  5 as a generator. I have used the PrimitiveRoot function in the NumberTheory package of Mathematica. As a simple (incomplete) verification I have raised the generator to the power equal to one less than the moduli and have gotten an answer that is congruent to 1 as would be expected for any generator.
    
    Vince
    
    |-----Original Message-----
    |From: CAVANNA,VICENTE V (A-Roseville,ex1) 
    |Sent: Friday, July 12, 2002 9:11 AM
    |To: 'Paul Koning'; CAVANNA,VICENTE V (A-Roseville,ex1)
    |Cc: Black_David@emc.com; ips@ece.cmu.edu; tom@arcot.com
    |Subject: RE: IPS security draft: SRP groups
    |
    |
    |Hi Paul,
    |
    |I suspected as much, since I don't have a supercomputer on my 
    |desktop. Mathematica apparently also has the capability to 
    |perform a mathematical proof of primality and to produce a 
    |"certificate" using which Mathematica's results may be 
    |independently and easily verified. When I attempted to perform 
    |the proof on the smallest modulus (the one with 768 bits) my 
    |computer was rendered useless for over 20 minutes which just 
    |happened to be my threshold of tolerance for this morning. I 
    |will try again when I leave the office tonight and if I get 
    |any useful  results I will look deeper into the method.
    |
    |Vince
    |
    |
    |
    ||-----Original Message-----
    ||From: Paul Koning [mailto:ni1d@arrl.net]
    ||Sent: Friday, July 12, 2002 7:15 AM
    ||To: vince_cavanna@agilent.com
    ||Cc: Black_David@emc.com; ips@ece.cmu.edu; tom@arcot.com
    ||Subject: RE: IPS security draft: SRP groups
    ||
    ||
    ||>>>>> "vince" == vince cavanna <vince_cavanna@agilent.com> writes:
    ||
    || vince> Hi David, I can't prove so, but Mathematica from Wolfram
    || vince> certifies as prime (in a matter seconds) all five moduli
    || vince> specified in the iSCSI security draft for use in SRP! I used
    || vince> the PrimeQ built-in function. PrimeQ first tests for
    || vince> divisibility using small primes, then uses the Miller­Rabin
    || vince> strong pseudoprime test base 2 and base 3, and then uses a
    || vince> Lucas test. I have not explored the nature of these tests.
    ||
    ||Miller-Rabin is a probabilistic test.  As for "Lucas" -- the Handbook
    ||of Applied Cryptography lists "Lucas-Lehmer primality test for
    ||Mersenne numbers".  That suggests that this test has no meaning for
    ||numbers that aren't Mersenne numbers (such as randomly chosen
    ||numbers). 
    ||
    ||So I think you have a probabilistic primality test here, similar to
    ||what Tom did.  That's certainly useful confirmation, but it doesn't
    ||sound like we have the primality proofs yet.  (Unfortunately, HAC is
    ||not sufficiently helpful in pointing to an algorithm to to so...)
    ||
    ||    paul
    ||
    |
    


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Last updated: Mon Jul 15 17:18:51 2002
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