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    RE: IPS-All: Reminder - Security draft last call ends Monday, Jul y 1 at 8am EST



    Title: RE: IPS-All: Reminder - Security draft last call ends Monday, July 1 at 8am EST
    I believe the initiator should be able to re-try authentication,
    provided that such re-authentication attempts don't occur at
    frequencies which could be interpreted as a DOS attack.  In
    any case, authentication should NOT be turned off for a target
    that is in the negative authentication cache.
     
    Josh
    -----Original Message-----
    From: Jonathan Trostle [mailto:jtrostle@corp.iready.com]
    Sent: Monday, July 01, 2002 3:17 PM
    To: 'Bernard Aboba'
    Cc: 'ips@ece.cmu.edu'
    Subject: RE: IPS-All: Reminder - Security draft last call ends Monday, Jul y 1 at 8am EST


    When a target ends up in the negative authentication cache, does that imply that the initiator will not contact the target while it's in the cache, or does  it imply that the initiator can contact the target but should not use IPsec (if IPsec failed)? Or shouldn't use app level security if app level security failed?

    Jonathan

    -----Original Message-----
    From: Bernard Aboba [mailto:bernard_aboba@hotmail.com]
    Sent: Saturday, June 29, 2002 10:42 PM
    To: jtrostle@corp.iready.com; ips@ece.cmu.edu
    Subject: RE: IPS-All: Reminder - Security draft last call ends Monday,
    July 1 at 8am EST


    >One comment/question on the security draft below:
    >
    >p. 23: "Where iSNS is used without security, IP block storage protocol
    >implementations MUST support a negative cache for authentication
    >failures."
    >
    >Is it worth pointing out that when iSNS is used with security, then a
    >negative cache MUST NOT be used? An attacker can cause authentication >to
    >fail through a DoS attack which could result in an entry being >added to
    >the negative cache.

    There are two orthogonal issues here -- one is iSNS security, the other is
    IPS protocol security. If iSNS is not secured, then a peer might receive and
    accept an iSNS packet from a rogue iSNS server. However, if the IPS session
    is subsequently secured, and mutually authenticated, the endpoint specified
    in the bogus discovery message will fail to authenticate. The argument is
    that this should result in a negative cache entry within the iSNS
    implementation, so as to prevent continual attempts to authenticate to bogus
    peers.

    If iSNS is secured, then presumably this would preclude a rogue iSNS server,
    and the negative cache is unnecessary.

    Do you have an issue with the negative cache in general, or just its use
    where iSNS is secured?





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Last updated: Mon Jul 01 19:18:49 2002
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