RE: iSCSI: possible DH-CHAP rationale

[David Jablon <dpj@theworld.com>]

At 07:06 PM 4/15/02 -0400, Black_David@emc.com wrote:
>> Reminder: This is NOT posted in my role as wg chair.
>> 
>> I thought I'd attempt to lay out a possible short
>> rationale for why DH-CHAP may be interesting:
>> 
>> (1) Assumption: If one is concerned about active attacks
>>       on session authentication, one should also be
>>       concerned about active attacks on the TCP session
>>       that    results after the authentication (e.g., TCP
>>       hijack for which exploit code is readily available).

Assumption (1) may be false, as it depends on considerations
that seem beyond the scope of the standard.

Following this path of trying to justify DH-CHAP on a technical basis,
one should identify all the situations in which an enemy that can receive
and send a packet may or may not be significantly different than a mute or
self-restrained enemy.

Even if the standard were amended to discuss these concerns, it would
surely result in something that is harder for people to safely use.

-- David